The sixth Majlis elections on February 18 will mark an important turning-point in the power struggle that has haunted the mullahs' regime since Khatami took office in 1997.

The following is a brief assessment of the status of each of the ruling factions in the elections and the looming prospects:

Khamenei’s faction: Khamenei, the mullahs' supreme leader, and his faction have been using all the means at their disposal, including the watchdog Guardians Council, to eliminate rival candidates in order to maintain the current composition of the Majlis. But it is already clear that many diehard backers of Khamenei will not get a seat in the next Majlis.

Realizing this, Khamenei has made a bid to contain the looming crisis by ensuring the election of Hashemi Rafsanjani, regime's former president and current head of the State Expediency Council, and his subsequent speakership.

Ironically, while Khamenei was unwilling to allow Rafsanjani to run for a third term as president, now, due to the deep schism at the top and in society as a whole, he has been compelled to reach out to him for help.

Khatami’s faction: This is a heterogeneous grouping of several tendencies whose common denominator is opposition to Khamenei. It is comprised of 18 parties, organizations and associations, including the pro-Rafsanjani Kargozaran-e Sazandegi (Servants of Construction, SC), Jebh-e Mosharekat (the Participation Front, PF), the closest grouping to Khatami and headed by his brother.

The arrest and imprisonment of Abdollah Nouri, the most likely candidate of this faction for the post of speakership of the Majlis, has deprived this faction from having a leader during the elections. The Servants of Construction group which played a major role in Khatami’s election in 1997, strongly defends the presence of Rafsanjani and has made him the faction’s number one candidate. It considers Rafsanjani as its mentor and de facto leader. The other wing in this faction, the Participation Front, is vehemently opposed to including Rafsanjani in its list of candidates.

Rafsanjani and his role: As the Iranian Resistance’s Leader, Massoud Rajavi, announced some time ago, the arrest and imprisonment of Abdollah Nouri paved the way for the election of Rafsanjani and his speakership.

A number of groupings in the pro-Khatami camp, such as the PF and their dailies, including, Sobh-e Emrouz, Fat’h and Asr-e Azadegan, have launched a series of attacks on Rafsanjani and unveiled his past failures, linking him to the chain of political murders.

Conclusions and prospects: This election is no more than a sham. For the candidates are the very officials and operatives who have been involved in the suppression, murders and ravaging the Iranian people. Many of them are religious judges, Intelligence Ministry officials and those involved in terrorism.

Rafsanjani’s election to the Majlis and his probable speakership would represent a major blow to Khatami and his faction. Indeed, it has already fragmented and caused a schism in this faction. Many in this grouping stress that if the "left" were to lose the elections, this would mark the end for Khatami.

At the same time, Rafsanjani’s election represents a major setback to Khamenei as well. Indeed, by relying on Rafsanjani, Khamenei is choosing between the lesser of the two evils. While this tactic may temporarily save him from having to deal with an acute crisis, it gives Rafsanjani a share in the leadership and the velayat-e faqih. This will adversely affect Khamenei’s position. For, unlike the current speaker, Nateq-Nouri, Khamenei cannot dictate his policies to Rafsanjani.

What would Khamenei do if he is unable to control the outcome of the Majlis elections even after securing Rafsanjani’s backing and Khatami’s reluctant consent? Will he easily submit to such a development or will he create another crisis to delay the elections in order to thwart the climax of the internal crisis which would mean losing total control of the situation and the regime’s overthrow? It seems unlikely that he would accept a fait accompli and not use his resources to defend the very existence of the velayat-e faqih.

One thing is certain. Whichever way the events turn, the regime will emerge a lot weaker and much more vulnerable after this election.

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