"This is one of the most important factors which not only prevented the Khomeini regime from launching a large-scale offensive on the order of Karbala 4 and 5 this winter, but also to suffer a military defeat at Faw. A defeat which wiped out the only `achivement' the, regime had to show for its warmongering.
It
should not be forgotten that Khomeini's failure to mobilize manpowerfor
the war is a direct result of the public's acceptance of the Iranian Resistance's
demand for peace and, in particular, Mr Massoud Rajavi's endeavors in this
regard. I can only conclude, therefore, that the addition ofthe NLA to the
war equation effectively changed the deployment of the regime's forces from
total offense to a much more defensive posture. This is, as you can see,
an extremely unpleasant developmen,t for a regime that can survive $nly
by warmongering and belligerence.
A smile appears on the commander's lips and I realize that his answer to my question is completed. The door opens and a combatant brings a message. Commander Zakeri explains that he had been invited to the marriage ceremony of two combatants, and the message is a reminder that he must get going if he is to be there on time. As I shake his hand in farewell, he says with a smile, "You are going to hear more news about the NLA soon." Something in the relaxed confidence of the former professor of electrical engineering is reassuring. As Commander Zakeri leaves the room, he waves with a final message: "See you in Tehran."
