Some five months have passed since the publication of the State Department's controversial report on the People's Mojahedin of Iran, a member of the National Council of Resistance. In this short period, the report has been completely discredited. Iranians reacted strongly, protesting its contents. The Mojahedin and NCR officially rejected the findings, and many members of Congress expressed outrage. The media ran a number of articles and commentaries by distinguished American experts, discounting the report. Perhaps most damaging was the hasty enthusiasm of the mullahs, who fired Scud missiles at a base of the Iranian Resistance just a week after the report came out.
An impartial report was, of course, not expected. Prior to publication, the State Department had stubbornly refused to hear the views of the Iranian Resistance, despite congressional insistence. Barely three weeks after publication, Gary Sick, one of the Department's main sources, suggested that the U.S. appoint Assistant Secretary of State Robert Pelletreau, head of Near East Bureau which prepared the report, as special envoy to Tehran's rulers. His proposal left no doubt that the authors espouse the same policy that brought about the Irangate scandal: appeasing the Khomeini regime.
During this period, the role of the religious dictatorship in exporting terrorism, subverting peace, and arming, dispatching and directing extremists and fundamentalists in the region has been further exposed. Clearly, this has meant another policy failure for the authors of the report, proponents of appeasement, and those still searching for "moderate" factions within the tyranny of terror.
A number of recent developments indicate that the policy of appeasing the mullahs does not hold water in the international community, and is losing its traditional advocates in the U.S. as well. Palestinian and Israeli leaders have both emphasized that the Khomeini regime has emerged as the greatest enemy to peace and stability in the region. NATO's Secretary General also commented on the dangers of Khomeinism, noting that "fundamentalism is at least as dangerous as communism was" to the European Union. Scandinavian countries rejected the regime's envoys. The Islamic Conference Organization condemned extremism, stressing the need to confront it, at the Organization's Summit in Casablanca. Meeting in Manama, Bahrain, the Gulf Cooperation Council expressed its concern about the dangers of fundamentalism. Chancellor Helmut Kohl and other senior German officials echoed the same concerns. Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, the Special Representative of the United Nations Human Rights Commission, issued two reports in November and February, and U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution in December, condemning Tehran's persistent human rights abuses and export of terrorism. Newt Gingrich, the U.S. House Speaker, spoke of the need to replace the Khomeini regime, while in the Senate, a bill was proposed to impose comprehensive sanctions against Tehran. Secretary of State Warren Christopher spoke out on the need for change in the "rogue state." These point to the isolation of a policy prevailing in the State Department's Near East Bureau that favors the criminal rulers in Tehran and opposes the Iranian Resistance,
The experience of the past 16 years has demonstrated that for historical, social and political reasons, change in Iran is possible only through the Iranian people and Resistance. Anything else is but a mirage. This is so clear-cut, that even those who do not approve of the Mojahedin acknowledge it. In its February 6th issue, Time Magazine wrote: "There is, though, an initiative the U.S. should take to maintain pressure. It should consult again with the People's Mujahedin, an important group opposed to the Tehran regime that the State Department has ignored since 1987. The Mojahedin are no angels.... Still they are thorns in Tehran's side and have helped exacerbate public discontent within the country. If the U.S. is as serious about Iran as Warren Christopher insists, it will not hurt to talk to this enemy's enemy."
The Iranian Resistance has long endeavored to establish democracy, independence, peace and stability in Iran. Some 100,000 people have given their lives for this cause. This Resistance cherishes the friendship of all those who respect the right of the Iranian people to resist. Fortunately, many in the international community and U.S. sympathize with our views. There are, however, others who subscribe to policies such as the one responsible for the 1953 coup against Dr. Mossadeq, who are nostalgic about the shah's era, or still live in the cold-war era of the '70s. They are behind the times. Meanwhile, the Iranian Resistance has a vast popular base and international recognition. We will not wait for the State Department to change its mind before bringing change to Iran.
In light of the developments of the past four months, perhaps there was no need for a detailed response to the State Department's report, particularly since the NCR's Foreign Affairs Committee had just published a book in September, Appeasing Tehran's Mullahs, which responded to the State Department's accusations. The report, however, was an unprecedented collection of any and all allegations fielded by the Khomeini regime, the shah's retinue and the pro-Moscow communists. The present book elaborates on the Iranian Resistance's positions and views on the issues mentioned in the report. We hope that it provides a better understanding of the Iranian Resistance and Mojahedin, and in opening up this debate to the public on the roots of this hostility. It is our hope that it will contribute to a constructive discussion of a proper policy towards the regime ruling Iran.
In the course of preparing this book, all of the sources cited by the State Department and many other books and articles were consulted. We spoke privately with many experts in the U.S., Europe and Middle East. We have tried to stick mostly to the sources and experts the State Department has cited. Needless to say, citing these sources does not necessarily imply our approval of their views. We also interviewed a number of the Mojahedin's officials. Sections of the book dealing with the Mojahedin have been prepared in cooperation with them, under their responsibility.
National Council of Resistance of Iran
Foreign Affairs Committee
1 March 1995